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RULE 14A-8 AND THE EXCLUSION OF PROPOSALS THAT
VIOLATE THE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”)
created Rule 14a-8 in 1942 to allow certain shareholder proposals to be
included in a company’s proxy statement. 1 The Rule also included thirteen
substantive grounds for excluding a proposal. Specifically, subsection
(i)(2) allows for the exclusion of proposals “which, if implemented, would
violate . . . state law or federal law of the United States, or any law of any
foreign jurisdiction, to which the [company] is subject.” 2
Originally arising from an informal staff interpretation, the Commission amended Rule 14a-8 in 1976 to add the exclusion. 3 The provision
applied to proposals that necessarily required the corporation to act in a
manner that would conflict with law. The exclusion did not apply to proposals that could violate the law. Moreover, the SEC sometimes allowed
shareholders to rewrite a proposal to avoid application of the exclusion.
This paper will lay out the administrative history of Rule 14a-8(i)(2)
through the changes made in 1998. The paper will also trace the staff’s
interpretation of the provision with particular emphasis on interpretations
during the new millennium. Finally, the paper will analyze the exclusion
and present possible changes in the staff’s interpretation.
II.ADM INISTRATIVE HISTORY OF SUBSECTION (I)(2)
A. Evolution of the Exclusion
When adopted in 1942, Rule 14a-8 did not include an explicit exclusion for proposals that violated the law. 4 Nonetheless, the staff adopted an
informal position that allowed for exclusion in these circumstances. In a
no action letter issued to American Motors in 1972,5 the staff found that a
1. Because Rules are adopted pursuant to authority given to an agency under a statute, 14a-8
was adopted pursuant to authority under the Exchange Act but it did not involve or require an amendment to the Exchange Act.
2. Rule 14a-8(i)(2).
3. Prior to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) the was a rule called 14a-8(c)(2) which was given life in the Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders, Release No. 12999 (adopted Nov. 22,
1976). Since the law’s enactment in 1942, the staff had only informally excluded shareholder proposals from proxy materials for violations of the law, but this release prohibited the same violations
of law formally and adopted only minor changes in language.
4. T he Commission originally numbered the Rule x-14a-7. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Release
Notice, Release No. 2376 (Jan. 12, 1940).
5. Am. Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 9369, at *4 (Nov. 29, 1972). The proposal sought the right to have shareholders vote “ For” or “ Against” a matter on the proxy. The company argued that the proposal would have “unreasonably restrict[ed] the right of a shareholder to vote
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proposal that would restrict a voter’s right to delegate their proxy conflicted with the law of Maryland. Similarly, in a letter to the General Electric Company 6 (“GE”), the staff found that a proposal calling for the company to breach legal contracts contradicted the law. The staff also permitted the exclusion of proposals that defied foreign law because this contravened state law by causing a corporation to exercise authority “in defiance
of any statute in a jurisdiction where such company [was] doing business.” 7
The staff interpretation only applied when proposals necessitated a
conflict with the law. In Allis-Chalmers Co.,8 management failed to sufficiently show that the proposal “necessarily required the performance of
illegal acts. . . .” As a result, the staff decided not to permit exclusion from
the proxy materials. In another letter issued to Newmont Mining Co.,9 the
staff refused to permit the exclusion of a proposal that called for the company to solicit new laws advocating affirmative action in South Africa because the provision would “require the company to seek new laws only to
the extent it [was] legally able to do so. . . .” 10
The Commission proposed to add an explicit exclusion for proposals
“contrary to the federal law of the United States” in 1976. 11 The release
noted that the amendment was consistent with “a view that [the] staff has
expressed informally on numerous occasions in the past.” 12 Commentary
on the proposal sought expansion to “allow the omission of proposals
whose implementation would violate not only federal law, but also any
other applicable law (including foreign law) or governmental regulation to
which the corporation is subject. . . ” 13

by proxy as authorized by statute, so [it] would be invalid and unenforceable under the laws of the
State of Maryland.”
6. General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, CCH Intelliconnect, (Feb. 1, 1973). This proposal called for the “suspension of all military contracts relating to the military action in Southeast
Asia.” According to the staff, the proposal had the potential to violate the law because it “would require
GE to violate federal law by breaching legal contracts, many of which [were] with the American government itself.”
7. Newmont Mining Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9174 (March 20, 1973). In this case
the Newmont Mining Corporation sought exclusion of a shareholder proposal which proposed the
initiation of affirmative action programs at company facilities in South Africa despite apartheid practices prohibiting such programs.
8. Allis-Chalmers Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8871, at *1 (Mar. 4, 1974). In this
case, the proposal requested the Board to divest 40,000 shares of the company’s common stock from
a former executive. The executive acquired the shares as a part of his employment contract. Management argued the proposal would result in a breach of contract.
9. Newmont Mining Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 6883 (March 27, 1974).
10. Id.
11. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders (S7-643)., Release No. 9343 (proposed July 7, 1976)
12. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders (S7-643)., Release No. 9343 (proposed July 7, 1976).
13. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders (S7-643)., Release No. 9343 (proposed July 7, 1976).
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The final rule permitted the exclusion of proposals that violated federal, state, and foreign law. 14 However, the provision did not apply where
the foreign law “would be violative of any state law or federal law of the
United States.” 15 Moreover, matters that depended upon interpretations of
law, also required an opinion of counsel. 16
B. Staff Interpretation
In construing the exclusion, the staff sometimes rejected a company’s
position because of an inadequate opinion of counsel. In one case, the staff
noted that the company did not “quote the provision cited nor . . . provide
any citations to any decided cases which would indicate that the proposed
action would be illegal under that provision . . . .” 17 Most notably, in no
action letters issued after the amendments, the staff increasingly allowed
for redrafting to cure a shareholder proposal that potentially resulted in a
of law.
1. State Law
The exclusion applied to proposals that violated state statutes. For
example, in letters issued to BankAmerica Corp. and Crocker Nat'l
Corp.,18 shareholders submitted proposals that sought to require disclosure
of information about the identity of their large investors. Management argued in both cases that confidentiality restrictions prohibited disclosure
without the express consent of the individual account owners. The staff
allowed for exclusion, agreeing that California law prohibited a trust company from “disclosing any information concerning the existence, condition, management and administration of any private trust confided to it.”19
In General Motors Corp.,20 the staff permitted the omission of a
shareholder proposal calling for the withholding of bonuses from employees following significant recalls of vehicles. Management pointed to New
York law that authorized criminal prosecution for employers who refused
to pay wages, benefits, or wage supplements when required. In a letter to
14. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders, Release No. 12999
(adopted Nov. 22, 1976).
15. T he staff explained this language by example: “ where a proposal would call for an action
by the issuer to bring it into compliance with state or federal law, the fact that such action might be
violative of a particular foreign law to which the issuer is also subject would not cause the proposal to
be excluded under subparagraph (c)(2)”. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Sec.
Holders, Release No. 12999 (adopted Nov. 22, 1976).
16. See Rule 14a-8(d)(4) 17 CFR 240.14a-8(d)(4). See also Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a8, Release No. 12734 (proposed Oct. 14, 1982) (noting that for exclusions under (c)(2), “the Commission staff requires an opinion of counsel”).
17. California Real Estate Inv. Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14299, at *1 (Mar. 27,
1980).
18. BankAmerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 13922, at *6 (Feb. 17, 1977);
Crocker Nat'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 13924, at *1 (Feb. 17, 1977).
19. T he Commission used the same language in both of these cases and a handful of other
similar no action letters, which requested the same private information. Id.
20. Gen. Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 26256, at *1 (Mar. 6, 1981).
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Proctor & Gamble,21 a proposal potentially violated the law by calling for
the board to implement cumulative voting when the board did not have
unilateral authority to do so. Management pointed out that statute required
specific procedures (notice requirements) that the company could not implement given the timing of the annual meeting.
The exclusion also applied to proposals that violated a company’s
bylaws and charter. In Time Warner Inc.,22 shareholders tried to amend
the company’s bylaws to allow for cumulative voting. Management argued, however, that cumulative voting required amendment to the articles
of incorporation. The staff agreed and allowed for exclusion of the proposal. In Avondale Industries Inc.,23 shareholders wanted to amend the
company’s bylaws to establish a Compensation Committee consisting of
three independent directors. Management asserted that these changes
would be inconsistent with the articles of incorporation. The staff agreed
that a proposal calling for a bylaw that contravened the articles violated
the state corporate law.
Likewise, companies could exclude proposals that interfered with a
board’s fiduciary obligations in violation of state law. 24 In Bank America
Corp., the proponents called for the formation of a shareholder committee
to select replacements to fill board vacancies. Management argued that the
proposal would divest them of their authority, under state law, to fill vacancies. The staff agreed that the proposal would “impermissibly” force
the directors to “abdicate their responsibility to exercise best business
judgement in filling future vacancies on the board by binding themselves
to comply with the provisions of this proposal.” 25
In Lyondell Petrochemical Co.,26 a shareholder proposal specifically
provided that the Union Representative for the company be chosen not by
the Board in the exercise of its business judgment but by an appointment
process in which the Board and the stockholders did not participate. Management argued that nominations were part of its responsibilities. The staff
agreed, stating, “The Commission had previously recognized that a shareholder proposal seeking to divest a board of directors of its responsibilit ies
regarding nominations may be excluded . . . .” 27

21. The Procter & Gamble Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25079, at *1 (July 1, 1981).
22. Time Warner Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286263, at *1 (Mar. 23, 1990). The
staff did provide that the proposal could not be excluded if revised by the proponent within the specified time period.
23. Avondale Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 82754, at *1 (Feb. 28, 1995).
24. State law generally provided that the “business and affairs of a corporation” would be “managed by or under the direction of a board of directors” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a).
25. Bank Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14334, at *2 (Mar. 10, 1980).
26. Lyondell Petrochemical Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 47332, at *3 (Feb. 19, 1993).
27. See also the Growth Fund of Spain, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 272422, at *7 (Mar.
15, 1996) (exclusion of a proposal that could result in a violation of the board’s fiduciary duties).
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2. Federal Statutes and Rules
The staff also allowed exclusion of proposals that violated federal
statutes. Shareholders in Reserve Oil and Gas Co. 28 submitted proposals
seeking to avoid communist influence within the company by excluding
people of specific national origins from the board of directors. The staff
agreed with the management that discrimination of this sort was “clearly
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act . . . .” 29 The Ford Motor
Co. 30 shareholders sought disclosure of outstanding defense contracts with
the United States Government in connection with the Reagan Administration’s “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative. Management argued that
the information could be used in violation of national security and secrecy
statutes. 31 The Staff agreed that the proposal was excludable but allowed
amendment to provide
The staff also applied the exclusion to violations of federal rules and
regulations. Shareholders in GE submitted a proposal that would prohibit
the company, under certain circumstances, from sharing employee compensation information with the Internal Revenue Service or other governmental agencies. Management argued that the proposal would violate regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury. 32 The staff agreed, concluding that “properly adopted administrative regulations have the force
and effect of law until rescinded by the agency, superseded by Congressional action, or invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 33
3. Foreign Law
Some no action letters involved allegations of violations of foreign
law. In Standard Oil Co. of California,34 a shareholder proposal called for
the company to stop selling petroleum products 35 to the police and military
forces of the South African government which imported nearly all its oil.
Management argued that the proposal called for a “boycott of sales of
products to the military and police of South Africa and would constitute a
violation of the laws of the Republic of South Africa . . . .” 36 The SEC
Staff agreed and permitted exclusion.
Companies sometimes obtained exclusion of proposals consistent
with foreign, but inconsistent with United States law. In the Fort Motor
28. See also Signal Companies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13049, at *14 (Jan. 25,
1978); Toledo Edison Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13785, at *1 (Jan. 11, 1979).
29. Reserve Oil & Gas Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 15065 (Feb. 28, 1977).
30. Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55898, at *1 (Apr. 11, 1985).
31. In this case, Section 793(d) of T itle 18 of the United States Code.
32. Specifically T reasury Regulation § 31–3402(f)(2)–1(g).
33. Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 47201, at *2 (Jan. 13, 1984).
34. Standard Oil Co. of California, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30796, at *1 (Feb. 24,
1983).
35. See also Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66484, at *1 (Jan. 3, 1986).
36. Standard Oil Co. of California, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30796, at *1 (Feb. 24,
1983).
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Co., and Am. Brands, Inc.,37 no action letters, proposals calling for the
adoption of the McBride Principles in Northern Ireland38 had the potential
effect of requiring the imposition of quotas or preferential treatment for
underrepresented groups. Companies argued that the approach amounted
to reverse discrimination, thereby conflicting with American law. 39 The
staff agreed that the requirements of United States law took precedence
and therefore allowed exclusion. 40
C. Curing the Deficiency
In some cases, the staff permitted shareholders to amend a proposal
to avoid the application of the exclusion. In McDonnell Douglas Corp.,41
a proposal sought to require the company's Board of Directors to nominate
individuals selected by a minority group of stockholders. Management argued that this usurped their business judgement in violation of Maryland
law. 42 The staff agreed but allowed shareholders to amend the proposal to
provide that the employee-nominee would not be considered to be a nominee of the Board of Directors.
In Equimark Corporation.,43 a proposal sought to amend the company’s by-laws to change the company's executive termination policy.
Management argued that the proposal was inconsistent with the company’s contractual obligations and therefore violated state contract law.
The staff agreed but allowed shareholders to revise the proposal to avoid
violating the articles. 44
The staff has sometimes permitted revisions that rendered the proposal precatory. In Marriott International Inc.,45 a proposal would have
required the board of directors to amend the company’s Articles of Incor-

37. Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66540, at *1 (Mar. 19, 1986); Am.
Brands, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55910, at *1 (Mar. 5, 1985);
38. T hese consisted of nine fair employment principles which served as a corporate code of
conduct for United States companies doing business in Northern Ireland. Investment Responsibility in
Northern Ireland: The MacBride Principles of Fair Employment Neil J. Conway
39. In both cases management asserted that “such action would mean a person from another
religious group would be treated less favorably than a person from an under represented religious
group.” T he staff agreed, reasoning “[these] proposals seem to imply positive discrimination and legislation in the US and UK at the time provided for equality of opportunity and outlawed preferential
treatment, including positive discrimination.” Id.
40. See also Fruehauf Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65334, at *4 (Mar. 5, 1986).
41. McDonnell Douglas Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 87870, at *1 (Mar. 23, 1993).
42. Specifically, section 2–401(a) of the Maryland General Corporation Law provides that
“ [t]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the direction of the Board.”
43. Equimark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 76,108 (Feb. 13, 1992).
44. In this case, the staff said the defect could be cured if the proposal were revised to apply
only to future employment contracts and to be limited to a request or recommendation that the Company's Board of Directors take the steps necessary to implement the proposal. Id.
45. Marriot Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 97656, at *1 (Mar. 5, 1998).
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poration to add a provision mandating abstention by the officers and directors from making certain decisions. 46 Management argued that this
would usurp board discretion and violate the law. The staff allowed redrafting of the proposal to be precatory in nature. In Kmart Corp.,47 shareholders wanted to amend the company’s Articles of Incorporation to eliminate staggered terms for directors. Management asserted that the proposal
would cause the company to breach existing contractual obligations by
prematurely shortening the terms of existing directors. The staff reasoned,
“The defects could be cured, if the proposals were redrafted to be advisory
. . . .” 48
III. 14A-8(I)(2) AND THE NEW MILLENNIUM
The Commission rewrote Rule 14a-8 into plain English in 1998. With
respect to the exclusion for conflicts with the law, the Commission
adopted only minor revisions and otherwise left the regulation unchanged. 49 The provision continued to apply to proposals that would result
in a violation of “any state, federal, or foreign law” and the staff still permitted modifications to proposals that would allow them to avoid application of the subsection.
A. Claims for Violations of State Law Post 1998
Violations of state law remained one of the most common grounds
for exclusion. However, to the extent that the basis for exclusion involved
a board’s fiduciary obligations or the authority of shareholders, resolution
was often not easy. State law had few decisions in the area. Moreover, in
some cases, shareholders could obtain an opinion of counsel opposite that
of management’s.
In one case, the CA, Inc.,50 the Commission sought to resolve the
predicament by ying the Delaware Supreme Court. In this case, the proposal recommended an amendment of the bylaws to provide procedures
for reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred by shareholders in
connection with the nomination of a candidate to the board. 51 Management
argued that the provision would, effectively vest in the stockholders, rather

46. In this case the board could not of its own accord amend the company's charter. Instead, in
order for the charter to be amended, the board had to determine the advisability of the amendment then
submit the matter to shareholders.
47. Kmart Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 97543, at *1 (Mar. 4, 1998).SEC No-Action
Letter,
48. Id.
49. T he Commission renumbered the subsection from (c)(2) to (i)(2). 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(2).
50. Ca, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2568454, at *5 (June 27, 2008).
51. T he
petition
to
the
Court
can
be
found
here
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert.pdf.
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than the board the ability to manage the business and conduct the affairs
of the corporation. 52 Shareholders, however, disagreed. 53
The Delaware Supreme Court granted review. 54 The court found that
the proposal was a proper subject for shareholders but that e not obligation
to reimburse costs could infringe on the ability of directors “to discharge
their fiduciary duties.” 55 Following the decision, the Commission permitted exclusion.
Proposals that resulted in violations of articles of incorporation or
bylaws also continued to be subject to exclusion. In Boeing Co. 56 shareholders wanted to mandate that every corporate action requiring shareholder approval be adopted by a simple majority vote of shares. Management asserted that this would “result in violations of the company's
own bylaws” and constituted a violation of Delaware law. The staff agreed
with management and allowed exclusion of the proposal. 57
B. Claims for Violation of Federal Statutes and Rules Post 1998
Some letters turned on possible violations of federal statutes and
rules. In Pfizer,58 a shareholder proposal sought to amend the bylaws to
provide that parties must use arbitration to settle certain controversies or
claims, including those arising under federal securities laws. Pfizer argued
that the proposal would actually violate federal securities law by preventing any shareholder claim already subject to arbitration. 59 The staff agreed
and permitted exclusion of the proposal.

52. Ca, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2568454, at *5 (June 27, 2008).
53. Shareholders argued that because the bylaw concerned the process of the nomination and
election of directors, it was an appropriate subject matter for shareholder action under established
Delaware law. “ Delaware courts have long exercised a most sensitive and protective regard for the
free and effective exercise of voting rights.” Ca, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 2008 WL
2724908 (Del.Supr.).
54. T he Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that “The Division was thus confronted with two
conflicting legal opinions on Delaware law. Whether or not the Division would determine that CA
may exclude the proposed Bylaw from its 2008 proxy materials would depend upon which of these
conflicting views is legally correct. To obtain guidance, the SEC, at the Division's request, certified
two questions of Delaware law to this Court. Given the short timeframe for the filing of CA's proxy
materials, we concluded that there are important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination
of the questions certified, and accepted those questions for review.”
55. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236 (Del. 2008).
56. The Boeing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 114380, at *1 (Mar. 4, 1999). Boeing’s
bylaws required a majority vote of all outstanding shares, not merely those present.
57. See also AT&T, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 485463, at *15 (Feb. 19, 2008). In
that case, shareholders recommended that the company implement cumulative voting by means of a
corporate bylaw or policy. The staff reasoned that Delaware General Corporation Law allowed cumulative voting only if it was authorized in the company’s certificate of incorporation. Even if the proposal were changed to request an amendment of the certificate to implement a cumulative voting
scheme, AT&T could not commit to implement it because any such amendment must first be adopted
and declared advisable by the Board and then submitted to the stockholders for their approval.
58. Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012).
59. T his would violate Section 29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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Conversely, in the Charles Schwab Corp. 60 no action letter, a shareholder proposal requested a comprehensive breakdown of the company’s
workforce by race and gender. The company stated the proposal was improper because it called for disclosure of private data in violation of federal
statutes. The staff disagreed noting that the proposal only requested voluntary disclosure.
C. Curing the Proposal
Even when the staff agreed on the exclusion of a proposal, it often
continued to give specific instructions on how to remedy the problem and
a timeframe (usually seven days) to complete the revision. From 1998 until
2016, the staff permitted the exclusion of about 200 proposals under subsection (i)(2). 61 In sixty-eight of the letters (33.33%), the staff provided
advice on how to cure the deficiency. 62
In Anthem,63 a proposal asked that the company take the steps necessary to reorganize the board into one class with each director subject to
annual election. Management stated this would cause Anthem to breach
existing contractual obligations. The staff agreed but advised that if the
company revised the proposal within seven days to state that it would defer
its implementation until it would not interfere with Anthem's existing contractual obligations, management could not exclude the matter.
In Exelon,64 shareholders proposed that the board of directors and the
compensation committee limit the compensation for each named executive
officer to one hundred times the median annual total compensation paid to
all employees of the company. Management argued the proposal would
cause Exelon to impermissibly restrict the ability of its Board of Directors
to determine the level and form of compensation for certain Exelon executive officers and to establish compensation plans in violation of the provisions of state law. The staff advised that if the proposal were recast as a
recommendation or request to the board of directors, it would not necessarily require a violation of law. The staff provided that the proposal seven
calendar days.
IV. ANALYSIS AND OVERALL INTERPRETATION OF STAFF DECISIONS
The exclusion for violations of the law has proved difficult to use.
Companies generally must obtain an opinion of counsel demonstrating the
violation. In addition, shareholders have an equal right to do so. The staff,

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

The Charles Schwab Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 69538, at *1 (Jan. 2, 2014).
Using the search terms (14a-8(i)(2)) /20 “ appears to be some basis”).
Using search terms (14a-8(i)(2)) /20 “ appears to be some basis” & “ could be cured”).
Anthem, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 139351, at *1 (Mar. 4, 2015).
Exelon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6355921, at *1 (Nov. 26, 2013).
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therefore, often confronts areas difficult to interpret with conflicting opinions of counsel. Given the uncertainty, the staff has routinely allowed
shareholders to revise the proposal to ensure that no violation occurs.
The statistics bear this out. From 1998 through early 2016, the staff
was “unable to concur” that a company could exclude a proposal under
(i)(2) in over 300 no action letters. 65 During the same period, the Staff
permitted the exclusion of around 200 proposals. Approximately one-third
of the excluded proposals were subject to cure. 66
Recent statistics suggest that the exclusion is used infrequently. In
2015, the staff allowed for the exclusion of only eight proposals under the
subsection 67 and offered advice on how to cure the defect in four of these.68
The staff permitted the exclusion of three proposals in 2014 with none
suggesting a cure 69 and five in 2013 with one permitting a cure. 70
Even if rarely used, the exclusion remains important. Most importantly, however, the exclusion demonstrates the importance of Staff
flexibility in the enforcement of Rule 14a-8. Unlike almost all other exclusions, the Staff under subsection (i)(2) routinely allows investors to
“cure” a proposal. The exclusion demonstrates that many shareholders can
avoid exclusion through modest revisions to a proposal. Perhaps the lesson
under this subsection is the importance of allowing “cures” under other
exclusions.
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65. Using the search terms (14a-8(i)(2)) /20 “ unable to concur”).
66. See Supra note 64
67. See Chart http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/empirical/Rule-14a-8i-2-Chart.pdf.
68. See supra note 67
69. See supra note 67
70. See supra note 67
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